The Ineffectiveness of the Tanzanian Accountability Framework - July 2011
Accountability is a cornerstone of good governance and a prerequisite
for sustainable development. We define ‘accountability’ as the responsible
use of power to make decisions on behalf of other people. Its implementation
requires a consistent framework that provides comprehensive
information concerning responsibilities, duties and reporting relationships.
To accomplish its Development Vision 2025, Tanzania needs to revise its national
accountability framework, identify existing inconsistencies and modify
its rules and practices accordingly.
Sikika wants to contribute to the necessary discussion about how the
current governance system can be improved. Therefore, we conducted an
analysis of several institutions which determine the powers and duties of the
public sector and its related oversight bodies. Consequently, we come up
with the following set of recommendations:
• curtail the president’s powers;
• facilitate political competition;
• abolish the cabinet’s collective responsibility;
• establish a Parliamentary Budget Office;
• improve the National Assembly’s integration into the budget process;
and
• provide comprehensive and continuously updated socio-economic
statistics.
The first three recommendations concern constitutional changes which require
a two-third majority in the Parliament. Fortunately, the country is
currently reviewing the prevailing Constitution. We, therefore, hope to contribute
to this process which is expected to last until April 2014. The other
recommendations require amending the parliamentary standing orders and
other relevant legislation.
Our line of argument features the following structure. First, we present
an accountability concept which will serve as a reference for the subsequent
examination of the legal provisions at hand. However, this perspective can
only indicate technical inconsistencies neglecting the question of how those
rules are actually enforced. For that reason, we complement the ‘de jure’
(by law) analysis with a case study of the Ministry of Health and Social
Welfare showing that those inconsistencies translate into ‘de facto’ (actual)ineffective oversight. In the end, we present our list of recommendations in the context of the main problems we found.
Generally, each accountability framework can be described through a
principal-agent-relationship, in which an agent acts on behalf of a principal.
This approach is very useful understanding people’s interaction in hierarchical
structures. However, diverging interests and scope for hidden action
put the agent’s compliance with its duties at risk. Therefore, it is absolutely
necessary to implement a sound accountability framework which resolves the
problem of asymmetric information among the two parties. Transparency
is a first prerequisite to enable the principal monitoring the agent’s activities
and decisions. Moreover, the agent must be answerable to its principal
for clarification purposes. Endowed with sufficient information, the principal
has the capability to align the agent’s incentives by means of adequate
sanctions. Commonly, the principal delegates the time consuming task of
monitoring the agent to an independent oversight body which is to report
to the principal who then has the power to sanction the agent.
The application of this accountability concept to the public administration
in Tanzania reveals several problems. One of them is the fact that,
according to the Public Finance Act (2001), the accounting officers and the
Accountant-General are both accountable to the Paymaster-General (who
is the permanent secretary of the Ministry of Finance and Economic Affairs);
however, in practice, it is the President who appoints and removes
them from office. Therefore, the Paymaster-General cannot deal with poor
performance by replacement. For that reason, we suggest curbing the President’s
appointing powers regarding those officers.
The National Assembly is the government’s principal. Since it does not
have the required time and expertise to scrutinize the numerous accounts
by itself, it authorizes the Controller and Auditor-General (CAG) to audit
all public institutions. Accordingly, the CAG is to inquire whether those
accounts conform to commonly accepted standards and if the citizens obtain
value for money. But the CAG’s independence is undermined by the
fact that s/he is also a presidential appointee, who is, in fact, the auditee.
One way to increase the CAG’s independence could be to let a parliamentary
committee shortlist some candidates from which the National Assembly,
which is the CAG’s principal, appoints its preferred one. The same mechanism
could apply to remove the CAG from office.
The CAG submits his/her audit reports to the National Assembly which
can hold ministers answerable by summoning them in the Parliament. However,
although the recurring audit queries in the MoHSW indicate that its
financial management has remained poor for more than ten years, the responsible
Minister cannot be demanded to resign because the Constitution
claims that the cabinet shall be collectively responsible in the National Assembly.
A passed no-confidence vote in the executive would leave the country
leaderless. Hence, the dereliction of duties usually remains unsanctioned.Assigning ministers the sole responsibility for all affairs within their jurisdictio would extend the National Assembly’s means to align the ministers’
incentives adequately.
Another identified problem is the current dominance of the National Assembly
by the ruling party (CCM) which has only a minor interest in criticizing
the government. Therefore, a strong opposition is needed to hold
the government answerable. Our case study shows that the opposition’s
responses to the Minister of Health and Social Welfare’s budget speech are
more challenging and specific than concerns raised by the CCM-dominated
Social Services Committee. To allow for independent representatives and
crossing the floor would weaken discipline of the dominant party, facilitate
political competition and potentially strengthen parliamentary oversight.
However, even if the Parliament is willing to challenge the government, its
influence on bills and the annual budget is significantly constrained by the
President’s power to dissolve the House in case of its disapproval. Therefore,
a rebalancing of power is needed. One possible ruling could be to give the
president veto power which can be overridden by having a two-third majority
in the National Assembly.
The current effectiveness of the Parliament’s oversight ability is constrained
by its insufficient analytical capacities, and it lacks mechanisms
to effectively follow up and enforce previous recommendations. An independent
Parliamentary Budget Office would facilitate the oversight process
by providing MPs with objective information regarding fiscal challenges and
budgetary trade-offs. Thereby, the current information advantage of the
government would be mitigated and allow the Parliament to come up with
more substantial recommendations. Moreover, the Parliament’s influence on
development policies would be enhanced by granting it amendment powers
and ensuring the timely submission of detailed implementation and audit
reports.
A large amount of public funds comes from development partners. Together
with the Tanzanian government, they agree on a performance assessment
framework (PAF) which serves as a benchmark for development performance,
assistance and future donations. The Public Expenditure Review
(PER) is one instrument to monitor the government’s budget performance.
But the responsible task team heavily relies on the cooperation of government
officers. Experience has shown that this translates into incomplete
accomplishments within their terms of reference. A further problem regarding
the assessment of the government’s performance is the weak routine data
system. It is, therefore, difficult to define specific development targets and
to assess the effectiveness of single measures. To obtain comprehensive and
continuously updated statistics, the National Bureau of Statistics needs to
be strengthened.
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